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Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a
Romantic Pragmatism
Charles L. Barzun*
Your letter of December 5 pleases me enormously, for the obvious
reason that it accords with views which I have been uttering [about
the difficulties offact-finding] for some sixteen years now.
Jerome Frank, Letter to Lon Fuller, December 12, 1946'
I have not had a chance to read [your] book yet, except for the
chapter on Natural Law, which I thought excellent. I am happy to see
that so many pseudo-issues are gradually evaporating, and I have
firmly resolved myself never to engage again in polemical writing.
Lon Fuller, Letter to Jerome Frank, October 24, 1949
INTRODUCTION
Jerome N. Frank (1889-1957) and Lon L. Fuller (1902-1978) are not
frequently classed together in discussions of twentieth-century legal
thought. Although they both wrote extensively about the nature of law and
adjudication over roughly the same period of time (1930s-1950s), they are
typically seen as standing on opposite sides of the issues that matter most
in legal theory. So, for instance, when H.L.A. Hart famously characterized
American jurisprudence as oscillating between two extreme views about
adjudication, he explicitly mentioned Frank as one who adopted the
"Nightmare" view (which sees judges as never deciding cases according to
* Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I would like to thank the
following people for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper: Neil Duxbury,
David Dyzenhaus, Angela Fernandez, Stef Feyen, Stephen Presser, Dan Priel, George Rutherglen,
Jack Schlegel, Simon Stern, Malcolm Thorburn, Anders Walker, William Wiecek, Kenneth Winston,
David Wolitz. I would also like to thank the editorial board of the Yale Journal of Law and
Humanities, whose anonymous criticisms and suggestions for improvement have made this a better
paper.
1. All of the letters between Frank and Fuller quoted in this essay can be found in Folder 334, Box
54 in Series IV of the Jerome New Frank papers, found at the Manuscripts and Archives of the Yale
University Library. Electronic versions of all of them are on file with the author.
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law), and he may well have had Lon Fuller in mind when he spoke of the
"Noble Dreamers" (who say that judges always decide cases according to
law, even when the applicable legal rules are unclear).2 Writing about the
same time as Hart, but drawing a slightly different distinction, Robert
Summers offered Fuller's understanding of law and adjudication as a
much-needed corrective to what he viewed as an "instrumental"
conception of law-a conception Summers thought dominant because it
included so many of the leading legal theorists of the twentieth century,
including Frank.
These depictions still appear to fit today. Frank is portrayed as an
"extreme" realist, who thought judges decided cases on the basis of
irrational biases.4 Meanwhile, Fuller is best known for being a critic of
realism, a defender of natural law, and an influential member of the legal-
process school of legal thought, which is itself seen as a response to
precisely those excesses of realism that Frank is said to epitomize.
But these classifications are misleading and incomplete. They are
misleading because they seem to license inferences about the views of
these thinkers that are not supported by what they actually wrote. Realism
is associated with an enthusiasm for the use of the social sciences in
studying law that Frank did not share.6 And legal-process theory is said to
involve a turn to procedure with the thought that doing so absolves judges
and legal scholars of the need to make substantive judgments of value,'
whereas Fuller emphasized repeatedly the inescapability of making value
judgments in all intellectual activities.
The classifications are incomplete because they fail to capture the
2. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 128, 132 (1983) [hereinafter "Nightmare"].
3. Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of
Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 434 (1978).
4. See Hart, Nightmare, supra note 2, at 128 (describing Frank's views and then observing that
Oliver Wendell Holmes "never went to these extremes"); see also Rodger D. Citron, The Nuremburg
Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, the Revival of Natural Law, and
the Development of Legal Process Theory, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 385, 391 ("[Frank's] views made
him an extreme - and extremely clear-spoken - legal realist.").
5. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 6
(1995) (characterizing Fuller, along with Roscoe Pound, Morris Cohen, and John Dickinson as the
more prominent and influential critics of realism); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 232 (1995). For the view that process theory amounted to a response to, or taming of,
realism, see, for example, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 254 (1992) (observing that Legal Process theorists sought to
"absorb and temper the insights of Legal Realism after the triumph of the New Deal").
6. See G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1014
(1972) (observing that "[i]n the early years of the twentieth century the focus shifted to the so-called
'social sciences': statistics, ethnology, economics, sociology," and linking that development to the rise
of legal realism). But see Charles Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1127
(2010) (interpreting Frank's realism as "humanistic" and influenced by the pragmatism of William
James).
7. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 36 (1996) (explaining that
process theorists attempted "to separate law from politics, process from substance, fact from values");
Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 590 (1988) (observing
that for legal-process theorists "in the realm of procedure, neutral, value-free r asoning was possible").
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common intellectual threads that link the thought of the two thinkers. As
the quotations that introduce this Article indicate, Frank and Fuller
corresponded for several years in the 1940s and 1950s, and each seems to
have found in the other a kindred spirit on matters related to the
philosophy, practice, and teaching of law. That they did so is not
particularly surprising if one looks carefully at their published work. There
one sees that they shared similar philosophical assumptions about the
nature of knowledge, which led them to take similar views about how
judges do and should decide cases. Specifically, both thinkers were
convinced that our perceptions of the world and our judgments about how
to act within it were indelibly shaped by our own emotions, purposes,
intuitions or motives (for short, I will sometimes call them "motives"8).
For this reason, both thought that sound adjudication required judges to
attend to their own intuitive reactions to the facts of cases before them and
to articulate as best they could how those reactions supplied grounds for
their decision - even though perfect articulation of such grounds was often
not possible. In other words, deciding cases properly required judges not
only to take in knowledge of the external world, but also to improve their
own self-awareness by engaging in a process of introspection.
These common threads justify characterizing Frank and Fuller as
members of what I call a romantic pragmatist strand of legal thought.
Theirs was a pragmatic view of adjudication because it viewed law in
instrumental terms and assessed the correctness of judicial decisions
according to how well they are validated by experience. But it was
romantic because it held that the relevant "experience" for testing and
guiding judicial decisionmaking-and practical reasoning more
generally-should include judges' own emotional responses to the facts of
the cases before them.9
The romantic form of legal pragmatism may be contrasted with a
8. 1 do so because this term strikes me as occupying a midpoint between "emotions" (which
connotes irrationality) and "purposes" (which connotes a certain practical rationality). The burden of
my essay is to show that although Frank used the former word more, and Fuller the latter, the intended
meanings are actually not so far apart. My hope is that using this more neutral word makes that point
clearer.
9. See infra, pp. 129-133 (elaborating on this meaning of pragmatism). Here I use the term
"romanticism" in a semi-technical sense. I mean to indicate in a general way this view's intellectual
connection to the literary and philosophical movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries by emphasizing the epistemic value it accords the emotions, particularly those triggered by
particular experiences. See The Romantic Period: The Nature of Romanticism, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA ("The most notable feature of the poetry of the time is the new role of individual thought
and personal feeling. Where the main trend of 18th-century poetics had been to praise the general,...
the Romantics found the source of poetry in the particular, unique experience."), available at
https://www.britannica.com/art/English-literature/The-Romantic-period. However, I do not mean for
my interpretation of Frank or Fuller to depend on any strong or controversial claims about the nature,
or most important elements, of the romantic movement as an historical and cultural phenomenon. If I
am wrong about that - if the account of romanticism offered below differs from what the reader
considers the best or consensus understanding of that movement - I am happy to have my account
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technocratic one. This view also sees legal concepts as instruments for
sound judicial decisionmaking, but it more narrowly defines the relevant
validating experience to include only the social, political or economic
consequences of a decision. Whereas the technocratic pragmatist takes
certain goals (or ends or values) as fixed and asks only whether a decision
one way or another helps meet that goal, the romantic pragmatist considers
the question of what the proper goal (or end or value) is to be itself part of
the object of inquiry.
Why bother labeling Frank and Fuller in this way? Almost every legal
thinker of the last century could plausibly classified as "pragmatist" in one
way or another, and yet this distinction enables us to distinguish among
different sorts of pragmatists in a way that has both historical and
contemporary relevance.o As an historical matter, the
romantic/technocratic dichotomy cuts across the realist/legal-process
divide and so offers us a new way of understanding mid-twentieth century
legal thought." As I show below, during both the heyday of realism in the
1930s and during the postwar period when legal process dominated the
scene, one finds both sorts of pragmatism at work.
Moreover, the core distinction endures into the present day. Take, for
example, Judge Richard A. Posner and former Justice David Souter. Both
of those judges see themselves as part of a pragmatist tradition, but they
interpret that tradition in quite different ways.12 For Posner it means
mostly that judges should take into account the economic and practical
consequences of their decisions, whereas for Souter it means, at least in
part, that they should reflect on how their own views have been shaped by
the social and political context in which they live.13 Both views are
10. See ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982);
Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1927 (2004) (referring to
the "pragmatic and instrumentalist core of twentieth-century American legal thought").
I1. As I note in Part Ill, this distinction follows one that Ken Winston has drawn in an effort to
distinguish Fuller's work from other instrumentalist theories. See Kenneth I. Winston, Is/Ought Redux:
The Pragmatist Context of Lon Fuller's Conception of Law, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 345
(1988). It also further develops Professor Duxbury's critique of the conventional view that legal-
process theory was a "response" to realism. DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 205.
12. See RICHARD POSNER, LAW PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2005) ("For some years
now . . . I have been arguing that pragmatism is the American judicial ethos and also the best guide to
the improvement of judicial performance," and then setting out to clarify what he means by
"pragmatism"); David Souter, Interview (Constitution Day, 2009) (describing what he means by
pragmatism and then explaining that such a view is "essential to my kind of judgment"), available at
http://www.c-span.org/video/?288993-2/former-justice-souter-constitution.
13. Compare Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 863
(1988) (arguing that a judge deciding an antitrust suit should first extract from legal materials an
overall goal, such as wealth maximization, and should then, "having made that choice," look to the
relevant legal precedent before making a "a policy judgment (in some cases it might approximate a
logical deduction) resolving the case in accordance with the principles of wealth maximization") with
David Souter, Conference on the Humanities in Civil Society (2009) (min. 25:00) ("In all sorts of
ways, later judges see things that earlier judges did not see. Or they deal with facts that were not faced
in earlier adjudication. To explain these kinds of cases fully a person has to know what it is that
changes judicial perception from one age to another. It may be differing individual experiences, but
more likely it is differences in the experience of the broader society over time. What an appellate
judge perceives depends on the common experience which e assimilates and brings with him to the
132 [Vol. 29:2
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plausible interpretations of the pragmatist tradition, but they point to quite
different understandings of the nature of the judicial task. Posner instructs
the judge to look outward and to the future in order to achieve the best
policy outcome; Souter asks the judge to look inward and to history in
order to ensure that she is properly fulfilling her judicial duty. Souter's
pragmatism is of the romantic sort.
This Article is primarily concerned with defending the first, historical
thesis. It aims to bring out the similarities between the views of Frank and
Fuller in order to reveal their common views on the nature of human
knowledge and of judicial decisionmaking. Part II begins that effort by
showing how the themes mentioned above can be found in their earliest
work. Since these themes are commonly associated with legal realism,
Part III seeks to clarify the sense in which Frank was a realist and Fuller a
critic of realism. Part IV then shows how over the next few decades Frank
and Fuller each developed these themes in different ways and for slightly
different purposes. But the common philosophical vision remains, and it
can be seen clearly by contrasting their views with a contemporaneous one
advanced by a pair of scholars under the name "policy science." Part V
then elaborates and defends my suggestion that Frank and Fuller may
profitably be seen as part of a romantic pragmatist tradition of law. It does
so by first spelling out in a bit more detail what I mean by each of the
terms in that description. It then explains why characterizing these mid-
century thinkers in that way matters for both the history and philosophy of
law.
H. THE EARLY WORKS: SOME COMMON THEMES
It seems to me that you have said in some of your earlier writings in
effect that facts are important because they are subjective. Fact-
finding and fact-interpretation represent a hole in the judicial
process through which subjectivity and personal predilection
enter.... Now I don't for a moment deny either the truth or the
importance of this assertion. It needed to be made.
Lon Fuller, Letter to Jerome Frank, Jan. 9, 1947
Several times during the past few years, I have meant to ask you why
you don't publish in book form your admirable early paper on legal
fictions. I try to tell the Yale students a bit about the subject - largely
ignored in most law-schools - and wish I could refer them to your job
in readily accessible form.
Jerome Frank, Letter to Lon Fuller, July 8, 1954
bench. And herein lies the problem. For judges are not very good at explaining this background or at
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Each of the authors under examination made one of his earliest and yet
most lasting intellectual contributions in the year 1930. In that year, Frank,
then a corporate lawyer from Chicago, published Law and the Modern
Mind, which fell "like a bomb on the legal world."1 4 And Fuller, still a
professor at Duke University, published the first of his now-classic series
of articles on legal fictions.'" Although in some ways the two works seem
to take on different issues and point in opposite directions, in them one can
find common assumptions and goals, which both authors would continue
to develop and expand upon.
A. Law and the Modern Mind
Frank's book is mainly about the problems of fact-finding, and it
amounts to an attack on the rationality of adjudication. More specifically,
it is a polemic against the common belief (or at least what Frank took to be
a common belief) 16 that the law is certain - a belief Frank calls the Basic
Myth. For Frank, the Basic Myth was a problem because it wrongly
ignored the way in which errors in fact-finding made it impossible to
predict how legal rules would be applied in any particular case. When
judges or juries evaluated evidence, especially the credibility of witnesses,
their judgments were frequently skewed by personal, idiosyncratic biases
and prejudices." But such errors had deeper roots in the intrinsic features
of the human mind. Drawing on the work of the German philosopher Hans
Vaihinger, Frank emphasized that our thought could never be "in complete
correspondence with factual reality."" Rather, the way we conceptualize
experience and hence perceive the world is colored by our own motives
and emotions. For Frank, then, the myth to be overcome was not just a
belief in legal certainty, but the belief that we can ever have certain
knowledge of anything.
Frank famously (or notoriously) attributed people's (including judges')
belief in certainty - and in particular, certainty in law - to their inability to
outgrow the emotional need they had as children for an authoritative
father-figure who would provide them with comfort and security.19 The
solution was therefore for judges to recognize the role that these emotions
and longings play in their own reasoning and to learn to relish, rather than
14. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Charles E. Clark, Jerome N. Frank, 66
YALE L.J. 817 (1957).
15. L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions: Part I, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930); Legal Fictions: Part II, 25 ILL.
L. REv. 513 (1930); Legal Fictions: Part 111, 25 ILL. L. REV. 877 (1930).
16. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
IN JUDGING (2009) (arguing that many of the skeptical views about law and adjudication associated
with legal realism had long before been accepted by judges and legal theorists).
17. Id. at 115 (observing that a judge's "own past may have created plus or minus reactions to
women, or blond women, or men with beards, or Southerners, or Italians, or Englishmen, or plumbers
or ministers, or college graduates, or Democrats").
18. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 173 (1949 ed.).
19. Frank repeatedly emphasized that his was a "partial explanation." See, e.g., id at 14 ("Chapter
II: A Partial Explanation").
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fear, the epistemic uncertainty that such a recognition entails. Judges who
could develop such self-awareness possessed what he called the "scientific
spirit" or the "modem mind" of the book's title.20 It was a mind "free of
childish emotional drags, a mature mind."21
B. Legal Fictions
Fuller's series of articles conducts a study of fictions that purports to
burnish the credentials of-rather than challenge-traditional common-
law methods of reasoning. Fuller set out to explain what fictions were and
what motivated their use in the law, and then to evaluate whether or when
fictions should be preserved or discarded. Fuller defined a fiction as "(1) a
statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its
falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility." 22 He
suggested various possible explanations for their use, but the most
important one was one he called "intellectual conservatism." This label
described circumstances in which a judge used a fiction "merely because
he does not know how else to state and explain the new principle he is
applying."23 In such a circumstance, rather than saying, "[fjor reasons
which are essentially inarticulate and not wholly understood even by
myself, I decide for the plaintiff," the judge instead might say, for
instance, that a defendant must be "deemed to have invited" a child onto
the land.24
Fuller, like Frank, drew on the work of Hans Vaihinger, who had argued
in his book, The Philosophy of 'As if,' that fictions-concepts which were
known to be false-were an essential feature of any form of intellectual
inquiry. What Vaihinger's work showed, Fuller explained, was that to talk
of fictions as being "false" was actually misleading because doing so
wrongly assumed the existence of an external reality by reference to which
we could judge these concepts to be untrue. In fact, our minds were
"instruments for enabling us to deal with [the] world." 25 They thus altered
reality in perceiving it. And that was true of all systematized forms of
knowledge. Thus, as long as they were used with proper recognition of
their fictional quality, fictions were a "sign of good mental digestion; it
indicates the vigor and capacity of our minds."26
C. Common Themes: Fictions and Science
Each of these works, though different in style and tone, reflects common
goals and assumptions. Frank hoped judges' increasing awareness of their
20. Id. at 268.
21. Id.
22. Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 15 at 369.
23. Fuller, Fictions II, supra note, 15 at 524.
24. Id. at 527.
25. Id. at 885.
26. Id. at 886.
2017] 135
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own biases and emotions would make them better judges and would
enable law to become a "portion of the science of human nature."27
Meanwhile, Fuller understood the value of fictions to lie in their capacity
to enable judges to achieve results they intuitively thought just but for
reasons they could not quite express articulately. More than that, the
scientific value of fictions, for Fuller, depended on a kind of judicial self-
consciousness. After all, if a judge came to actually believe the fiction he
invoked or invented-rather than just seeing it as a way to vindicate his
inchoate intuitions of justice-it became, in Fuller's view, a harmful
dogma.28
Frank and Fuller also offered nearly identical explanations for why the
natural sciences had seemed to enjoy more intellectual progress than legal
science. Fuller insisted that most of the motivations for legal fictions he
discussed had clear analogues in the social and natural sciences.29 But he
conceded that one motive for their use had no analogue in science: "What
I have called previously the fictions of emotional conservatism and of
policy and apologetic and merciful fictions proceed from stresses in the
judicial mind which, although probably not wholly unknown to the
scientist, are nevertheless not an important factor in his mental life." 30
That motive of "emotional conservatism" was one born of a "longing for a
feeling of conservatism and certainty."31
That longing for certainty was precisely what Frank had argued
handicapped legal thinking. When he took up the question of what
explains why lawyers and judges, but not (most) scientists, were plagued
by this psychological need for security, Frank dismissed concept-worship,
or "scholasticism," as an explanation (for that was a symptom, not a
cause), instead concluding that it was the subject matter of law that
triggered these longings for security in a way that the less emotionally
charged objects of natural-scientific inquiry failed to do.32 Like Fuller,
then, Frank distinguished between law and science by reference to the
human motives and purposes law activated, rather than by drawing a
metaphysical dichotomy between the domain of facts and that of value.
Finally, Frank and Fuller both characterized formal doctrine as in some
sense "fictional." Fuller saw judges as constantly applying the old and
inherited concepts and categories to new situations in order to achieve
justice in the cases before them. The result was that those concepts lowly
changed meaning. That process was constant and ongoing, and it was only
27. FRANK, MODERN MIND (1949), supra note 18, at 158.
28. Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 15, at 370 ("A fiction taken seriously, i.e., 'believed', becomes
dangerous and loses its utility.").
29. Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 15 at 905 (arguing that such legal concepts as rights, duties,
powers, and liabilities are "devices through which we organize and simplify our subject matter, and
correspond to such notions as 'energy,' 'matter,' and 'the force of gravity' in physics").
30. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
31. Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 15 at 520.
32. FRANK, MODERN MIND (1949), supra note 18, at 98-99.
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when that process of conceptual change seemed crude-when there was a
felt gap between the concept and the phenomenon to which judges were
trying to apply the concept-that we dub a concept a "fiction."3 3 Similarly,
Frank encouraged judges to see all law, insofar as it was constituted by
general statements, as fictitious and so properly used merely as an
instrument for achieving justice in the particular case.34
III. LEGAL REALISM AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM
With much of your criticism of Llewellyn and Moore in your
Pennsylvania Law Review article I concur. Llewellyn and I have
disagreed since we first met - because he blinds his eyes to the trial
courts. Much the same is true of Moore.
Jerome Frank, Letter to Lon Fuller, April 17, 1947
I am sorry if my passing reference to the Realists in my article on
Jurisprudence has caused misapprehension.. . I want to come back
to the point soon, and when I do I shall try to do fuller justice to
variations among the Realists, which your new introduction to
Modern Mind has done much to clarify.
Lon Fuller, Letter to Jerome Frank, Oct. 24, 1949
That these early works contain similar themes is not surprising since
they are themes commonly associated with legal realism, which was
reaching its peak around that time. Still, Fuller is known as an early critic
of legal realism.35 So the discussion above prompts at least two questions.
First, in what way was Fuller a critic of realism and in what way was he
sympathetic to its aims and aspirations? Second, to the extent that he was
critical of realism, was Frank's version of realism his target?
A. Fuller as Realist and Critic
Fuller endorsed some aspects of realism. Most important was the view
that the law as practiced frequently deviated from formal doctrine. The
very existence of legal fictions was itself evidence of the gap between the
language of the formal law and the results judges sought to achieve. If
there were no felt disconnect between the result the judge hoped to secure
and what the literal application of the relevant rules would seem to entail,
then, according to Fuller, there would be no need for fictions.36
Fuller further agreed with the realists that the sorts of non-technical
considerations that actually explain judicial practice sometimes justify it
33. Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 15 at 525.
34. FRANK, MODERN MIND (1949), supra note 18, at 179.
35. See DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 223 ("Fuller was both a critic and an advocate of realist legal
thought.").
36. Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 15 at 514-15.
1372017]
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as well. In an early article, entitled "American Legal Realism," he wrote
that "[o]ne of the chief services of the realist school has been to enlarge
the field of the legally relevant and to invest 'extra-legal' considerations
with a species of respectability."37 He even thought that the cause of legal
certainty-the value traditionally prized by legal scholars-was best
served by attending more carefully to such non-technical considerations.3 8
He observed, for instance, that he could sometimes generate greater
consensus among his law students as to how to resolve some particular
hypothetical dispute if he told them to ignore the law on the topic than if
he told them to apply it. The reason was that if he told them to apply the
law some of his students would struggle to find a creative legal rationale
to achieve the result that they all agreed was the just or fair one, while
others would apply the formal law irrespective of the apparent injustice of
the result.39
Finally, and as a consequence of the first two points, Fuller conceived of
the legal scholar's role as in part that of clarifying and improving legal
doctrine by identifying and tracing out the practical purposes that actually
motivated courts to decide cases the way they did, rather than by deducing
results from the "nature" of particular concepts. He subsequently
characterized his article on legal fictions as such an effort,"4 and his two-
part article on the role of reliance interest in contract law-now
considered a legal-realist classic- constituted a similar project.41
In what sense, then, was Fuller a critic of legal realism?42 Four main
criticisms stand out in his work. The first was his concern that the healthy
suspicion of conceptualism, which e endorsed (and in service of which he
conceived his own article on legal fictions), had been taken too far.
Sometimes characterized as "nominalism," the mistake, according to
Fuller, was to assume that only concrete tangible things mattered for the
purposes of law. He insisted, to the contrary, that "not all significant facts
are 'concrete."'43
Fuller made a related criticism of the realists' aim to use only empirical
methods to study the law. Many realists sought to distinguish clearly
between factual descriptions, on the one hand, and "value judgments," on
37. L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 434 (1934).
38. Id. at 436.
39. Id. at 436.
40. Id. at 443 n.31.
41. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE
L.J. 52 (1936), The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. (1937) (arguing that
courts often allow plaintiffs who have relied on promises to recover more often than the formal law
would seem to allow and suggesting that the doctrine would be improved by more articulately
recognizing such reliance as a legitimate basis for recovery).
42. Cf Myres S. McDougal, Fuller vs. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE
L.J. 827 (1941). Fuller took up, and criticized realism primarily in his article, "American Legal
Realism," supra note 38, though there he focuses narrowly on two realist works by, respectively, Karl
Llewellyn and Underhill Moore, and in his first book, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 46-65 (1940).
43. Fuller, American Legal Realism, supra note 37, at 447.
138 [Vol. 29:2
10
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol29/iss2/1
Barzun
the other." But Fuller thought that attempts to describe purposive human
action, whether that of judges or anyone else, in terms of pure "behavior"
resulted in poor descriptions. He thus criticized Underhill Moore's
"institutional" approach for its failure even to attempt to understand what
the bankers whom he was studying (for an analysis of banking law) were
trying to accomplish when engaging in the activities he described.45 One
cannot properly understand what is going on in some institutional context,
Fuller insisted, unless you understand why the individuals under
examination are taking the actions they are.
Third, Fuller criticized some realists for insufficiently appreciating the
value of legal certainty. With Frank clearly in mind, Fuller treated
dismissively the idea that a desire for certainty was "evidence of a childish
petulance, unworthy of the twentieth century mind."' He expressed the
same attitude toward Frank's suggestion that "the really enlightened and
normal person takes a 'positive delight in the hazardous, incalculable
character of life.' 47 To the contrary, Fuller thought that the realists
themselves had suggested useful ways in which the law could be made
more certain.
The fourth and final criticism Fuller leveled against the realists was the
same one he leveled against John Austin and John Chipman Gray. He took
the realists to be endorsing a form of legal positivism, which insisted on
distinguishing clearly between the law as it is and the law as it ought to
be.48 Fuller's quarrel with legal positivism was that it was not a productive
or useful way for the lawyer or judge to think about the law. Judges
deciding cases at common law were often struggling (and failing) to
articulate adequately the true motives and purposes for their decisions
(hence the need for legal fictions, as we've seen). But the legal realist who
studied only the "behavior" of judges did not recognize such motives as
part of the law since they were only (unobservable) aspirations of law as it
"ought to be." Fuller's concern was that by refusing to consider such
aspirations to be the "law," legal positivists (including legal realists)
directed the attention of lawyers, judges, and scholars away from the
motives which should properly serve as the law's guide for reform and
growth. He thus emphasized that he "did not care how realism defines
words" but instead was "concerned with the way it directs the application
of human energies in the law."49
44. See, e.g., Karl Lewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
445 (1930) (arguing that the "behavior approach" for which he was advocating "ceases to promise
objective agreement" once it begins talking of the "interests" law protects "except in this - that
isolation of the value judgement [sic], in presentation, from the observed phenomena on which it in
part rests, would clarify much discussion").
45. Fuller, American Legal Realism, supra note 37, at 455.
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id. at 433 (quoting FRANK, MODERN MIND (1930), supra note 14, at 17).
48. FULLER, QUEST, supra note 42 at 55.
49. Id. at 60.
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B. Frank as Realist and Critic
Which, if any, of Fuller's criticisms apply to Frank? The answer is that
most do not but that some do. First, as to anti-conceptualism. Frank, like
other realists, criticized the "scholasticism" of traditional legal thinkers, by
which he meant the tendency to ascribe undue significance to abstract
concepts.o Tellingly, though, in Law and the Modern Mind he argued that
a "scholastic" obsession with concepts was not the most important cause
of the false belief in legal certainty. Such an explanation was too
conclusory. The problem for Frank was not the reliance upon concepts and
abstractions as such; it was the false belief that those concepts and
abstractions corresponded to some "reality." Following Vaihinger, Frank
thus encouraged judges and lawyers to treat doctrinal concepts instead as
fictions, as tools suited for particular purposes."
Nor did Frank embrace the strict empiricist methodology that was
Fuller's target. To the contrary, he repeatedly emphasized the limits of
empirical methods. In his later work, Frank became increasingly critical of
what he perceived to be the deterministic-or, as he put it, "fatalistic"-
assumptions on which many social and natural sciences were predicated.52
Like Fuller, he denied the reality of "pure" facts. "A fact," Frank insisted,
"reflects, or results from, a human motive, interest, or purpose, in dealing
with experience."5 3 Facts were "human achievements, inventions, human
feats."5 4 Even in Law and the Modern Mind, Frank made clear he thought
the search for scientific certainty was as misguided as the search for legal
certainty."
On the question of the value of legal certainty, the issue is closer. As we
have seen, Fuller took particular aim at Frank's suggestion that the quest
for legal certainty represented a childish impulse. Furthermore, Fuller
looked for and valued in the law, more than did Frank, uniformities and
regularities.6 Even here, though, the differences are less stark than they
first appear. For the certainty Fuller longed for was one secured not by
rigid application of formal rules but instead by more faithful attention to
the purposes and values of the law. Hence the consensus he found among
his students, noted above, on what result common sense or basic fairness
50. FRANK, MODERN MIND (1949), supra note 18, at 69-70. Frank later changed his view on
scholastic philosophy and apologized for his earlier critique. See Jerome Frank, Legal Thinking in
Three Dimensions, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 9, 18 (1949) (observing that his "reference in [Law and the
Modem Mind] to 'scholasticism' were superficial and unfair").
51. Id. at 179.
52. JEROME FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 87 (Rev. ed., 1953).
53. Jerome Frank, The Place of the Expert in a Democratic Society 8 (Speech to the Brandeis
Lawyers' Society, 1944).
54. Id.
55. FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 18, at 307.
56. Cf id. at 105 (arguing that the "spirit of the creative scientist" is one which "yearns not for
safety but risk" and which "devotes itself to new ways of manipulating protean particulars and not to
the quest of undeviating universals").
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would require in the hypothetical case he posed to them.17 Frank made a
very similar point, suggesting that certainty in a "deeper sense" would
result if judges "are the more enlightened, the more quick to detect and
hold in check their own prejudices, the more alive to the fact that rules and
precedents are not their masters but merely agencies to be utilized in the
interest of doing justice."58
Fuller's final criticism, of the legal positivism implicit in legal realism,
also applies in part, but only in part, to Frank's brand of realism. On the
one hand, throughout his career, Frank argued that exposing the "realities"
of court practice - particularly trial-court practice - would stimulate legal
reform, rather than hinder it.59 He thus embraced Holmes's view that the
proper focus of lawyers, judges and legal scholars should be on what
courts "do in fact," rather than what we wish they did.60 On the other hand,
like Fuller, he sought to focus attention on the actual motives of courts,
and those included the "oughts" for which judges strive. "What the law
ought to be constitutes, rightfully, no small part of the thinking of lawyers
and judges," Frank explained. The key was to make such thinking
conscious, rather than unconscious.6'
C. Two Kinds ofInstrumentalism
We can now see some points of intersection between the ideas of Fuller,
the "critic" of realism and those of Frank, the "extreme" realist. Like other
realists, they both conceived of law in instrumental terms. That is, they
denied that legal concepts mapped onto objective features of the world;
rather, legal rules and concepts were best understood as tools courts use to
achieve certain goals. And like other realists, they thought legal practice
and theory could be improved by loosening the constraints the formal law
imposed on courts.
But here is where Frank and Fuller went in a different direction than
others did. Some realists sought to bracket off (at least temporarily) the
question of what ends courts should be pursuing and to focus instead
primarily on the empirical question of whether, and if so, how effectively,
courts were in fact achieving those ends. Karl Llewellyn, for instance,
implored scholars to scrutinize more carefully the "interests" that law
57. Fuller, American Legal Realism, supra note 37 at 436. Frank made the same point by
comparing two states whose formal criminal laws formally treated recklessness very differently, with
one allowing it to serve as a mens rea sufficient to establish what were only considered purposeful
crimes in the other state. Frank then showed how the punishments actually issued by judges made the
sanctions for similar crimes functionally comparable in the two states. FRANK, MODERN MIND (1949),
supra note 19, at 109-10.
58. FRANK, MODERN MIND (1949), supra note 18, at 134.
59. Frank emphasized this point in a letter to Fuller in 1947: "[B]eginning with the first stuff I
wrote on "jurisprudence" (Law and the Modern Mind) to date, I have been eager to dissipate the myths
about court-house doings, because I have felt that only a correct description of those doings would
help to bring about their needed reform." Letter to Lon Fuller, April 17, 1947.
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purported to serve and to examine whether what judges do actually serves
those interests. He sought a "comparison of facts with facts," he
explained; that is, "objective data, the specific data, claimed to represent
an interest, compared with the actual doings of the judges and the actual
effects of their doings on the data claimed to represent an interest."62
Similarly, Felix Cohen endorsed a "functional" approach to studying law,
which required scholars to "look behind the pretty array of 'correct' cases
to the actual facts of judicial behavior," and to use "statistical methods in
the scientific description and prediction of judicial behavior."63  As
Professor Summers explains, for such scholars, "law serves simply as
means to external goals,"" so the important question was whether it was
serving those goals effectively. As we'll see, this sort of instrumentalism
persisted in a less skeptical vein into the 1940s and 1950s in form of
"policy science."65
Neither Frank nor Fuller embraced that sort of instrumentalism,
however; nor did they advocate the use of empirical methods that such a
goal seemed to require. Instead, their instrumentalism was more global. As
Professor Kenneth Winston has said, Fuller's instrumentalism is "a thesis
about the practical nature of cognition."66 The same is true of Frank. The
lesson they both drew from Vaihinger was that even the concepts used in
the natural and social sciences should be understood as tools used to
achieve certain purposes rather than as descriptions of reality.67 Thus,
neither were as "enamored with the scientific method"6 8 as were other
realists, and each concerned himself (albeit in quite different ways) with
questions that empirical methods could not resolve - questions about
judicial purposes and goals themselves, about what motivates courts to
render decisions.
Still, that Frank and Fuller shared areas of concern and criticized the
62. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM [N THEORY AND PRACTICE, 446 (1962). 1
should note, however, that elsewhere, Llewellyn took an approach more similar to that of Frank and
Fuller. See Dan Priel & Charles Barzun, Legal Realism and Natural Law, in LAW, THEORY AND
HISTORY: NEW ESSAYS ON A NEGLECTED TOPIC (Maksymilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban eds.,
forthcoming 2017).
63. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 833 (1935).
64. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 435. Although they all "agreed that at least means could be
reasoned about," Summers explains, they denied that one could reason about the ends of law. Id. at
437. Such interests or ends of law were simply taken for granted as given. Thus, for them "the
problems of social ordering are divisible into two distinct stages: setting goals, and then devising
means to achieve them." Id. at 438.
65. See infra, Section V.A.
66. Winston, supra note I1, at 341 (distinguishing such a thesis, which he ascribes to Fuller and
whose roots he finds in the thought of William James and John Dewey, from "a superficial
instrumentalism," which "conceives of the forms of legal order simply as artifacts fabricated for the
attainment of independently given ends").
67. Cf Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 15, at 879 ("Where Ihering taught German lawyers to think
of legal rules in terms of purpose, Vaihinger is teaching them to regard legal thinking itself as a means
to an end.").
68. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 442.
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methods of social science is insufficient to establish an important
connection between their views. For what we want to know is why they
thought an empiricist approach inadequate for legal theory. Was the
reason the same for each of them? And if so, how could that shared
rationale have motivated their otherwise seemingly so different intellectual
ambitions?
We already know part of the answer. Frank and Fuller shared a
philosophical view, which they found in both Vaihinger and in the
American pragmatists, according to which the mind does not act as a
mirror to the world but instead acts upon it and does so for certain
purposes.69 But that shared philosophical premise cannot alone explain
their more mature accounts of law or adjudication because it is possible to
draw deeply skeptical conclusions from such a premise. If it is impossible
to observe pure "facts" about the world, then it would seem we have
reason to distrust all knowledge claims and view them instead as merely
the product of political, economic, social, racial, ideological, or simply
arbitrary interests, and hence irrational (or at least epistemically
unjustified)." And yet neither Frank nor Fuller drew such skeptical
conclusions. So inquiring into why neither did so will allow us to fill out
and make more concrete their distinctive brand of American legal
instrumentalism.
IV. THE SELF AS SOURCE OF MYSTERY AND VALUE
The law review boys asked me to read your "Say it with Music." I
found it stimulating and delightful. Throughout it reveals a rare
combination of wisdom and sensitivity. So far as any alleged
"ideological" differences in our viewpoints are concerned, I find
nothing in it to quarrel with.
Lon Fuller, Letter to Jerome Frank, March 26, 1948
I want to comment on some of your recent important comments in
[your review of] Patterson's book.... Your emphasis on the means
aspect of the means end relation is eminently desirable. It will indeed,
expand "the area of workable agreement."
Jerome Frank, Letter to Lon Fuller, July 8, 1954
Such an inquiry begins by identifying the premise on which the
skeptical conclusion just mentioned depends. The conclusion depends on
the assumption that the human motives which provide the criteria for
69. See Winston, supra note 11 (arguing, based on his reading of Fuller's private papers, that the
dominant philosophical influence on Fuller's thought was the pragmatism of William James and John
Dewey).
70. This is, of course, precisely the kind of conclusion some have interpreted "postmodemists" as
endorsing. Whether that allegation is a fair one is a question beyond the scope of this paper.
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selecting and organizing phenomena and so converting it into
"knowledge" are not themselves capable of evaluation according to
criteria of better and worse. But that is precisely the premise that Fuller
and Frank both rejected. Both thought that the emotions, impulses,
purposes, and motives that constitute the human self were (a) mysterious,
difficult to identify, and sometimes impossible to fully articulate but (b) a
source of genuine moral insight, at least under some conditions. It is the
combination of these two views of the human self that helps explain why
Frank and Fuller may be seen as part of a Romantic tradition of legal
thought that traditional dichotomies fail to capture.
A. Frank, Faith and Freedom
Throughout his career, Frank emphasized that the human self was
constituted by a variety of motives for an individual's actions and beliefs
that often remained obscure to the individual him or herself. We see this
view in Law and the Modern Mind in both his explanation of why the
Basic Myth (of legal certainty) is false and of why, despite its falsity, it
prevails among laypersons and judges. Frank argued that he law was
uncertain because when judges interpreted the law or made factual
findings they were beset by biases and prejudices of which they were
mostly unaware. At the same time, the myth in law's certainty endured
because people had failed to outgrow the need for the emotional security
they felt as children and so unconsciously sought a "father-figure" in the
law.
Frank did not pursue the particular father-figure theory much beyond his
book, but his focus on the self as full of partially conscious and
unconscious motives remained a constant theme in his writing. In fact, he
even voiced skepticism about the existence of a single "self' at all,
criticizing the tendency of some modem psychologists to insist upon the
need for an "integrated self." For Frank "[t]he over-integrated man-like
Hitler-is a totalitarian ideal."7 1 Instead, "each sane person has a host of
selves, and they are never unified, at one," so we should think of an
individual as a "democracy of selves," containing dissent, inconsistency
and even "anarchy" in its organization.72
Frank also continued to insist that the drives and motives that constitute
these various selves often remained opaque even to the person who
possessed them. He repeatedly praised Holmes, for instance, for having
recognized the importance of such unconscious motives.7 3 Idiosyncratic
71. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 404 (1949).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Thinking, 17 CORNELL L. Q.
568, 571 n.6 (1931) ('Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be
sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and
inarticulate convictions."') (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881));
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unconscious prejudices often explained why judges and juries believed
some witnesses rather than others, Frank asserted, but it was impossible to
control such biases through the use of legal rules.74
But Frank did not think that all such motives for decisions were
irrational. Given the attention he devoted in Law and the Modern Mind to
the biases and prejudices, the "plus and minus reactions," that plague
judicial fact-finding, and given the psychological neuroses that he thought
explained the desire for legal certainty, one might think that Frank was
pessimistic about the epistemic value of a judge's moral intuitions about,
or emotional reactions to, a set of facts. But such was not the case. Even in
that book, Frank expressed confidence in the wisdom of the judicial
"hunch."7  His point was that such inchoate and emotional reactions to
particular facts needed to be brought out and made more visible, rather
than distorted and frustrated by strict legal rules. We needed judges, he
explained, "'with a touch in them of the qualities which make poets, who
will administer justice as an art." We should therefore "encourage, not
discountenance, imagination, intuition, insight."76
This idea that adjudication was ultimately about achieving justice and
that justice was an art is a theme that Frank continued to develop and
emphasize. In one of his most oft-cited articles, "Words and Music," he
compared a judge's task when interpreting a statute to that of a performer,
who must interpret a composer's artistic purpose. "A judge with an
imaginative personality," Frank explained, "supplies 'an increment of
vitality that is ... desirable ... and truly necessary in order to put' the
legislative 'message across."'77
A year later, in "Say it with Music," Frank extended the analogy
between art and judging by comparing the possibilities for, and obstacles
to, effective criticism of trial-court findings of fact to those of art
criticism.78 As with the work of an artist, the problem for understanding
and evaluating a judge's fact-finding, Frank argued, was that the mental
processes by which a judge believes some witnesses rather than others is
mysterious, not only to critics but often to the judge himself. Frank thus
Jerome Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 370 (1948)
(observing that "Holmes, too, had frequently noted that sometimes subconscious factors affected
judges, that they sometimes decided cases intuitionally, that policy attitudes, too often entertained
unconsciously, influenced decisions").
74. Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 20, 24 (1951) (arguing that
the "the unconscious prejudices of trial judges or jurors for or against particular witnesses, or litigants,
or lawyers" are impossible to control through procedural rules); Jerome Frank, Modern and Ancient
Legal Pragmatism-John Dewey & Co. vs. Aristotle: 1, 25 NOTRE DAME L. Rev.. 207, 231 (1950)
(observing that procedural rules are ineffective at controlling "the unconscious prejudices of trial
judges or jurors for or against witnesses, or litigants or lawyers").
75. FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 18, at 111.
76. Id.atl81.
77. Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COL. L. REV.
1259, 1264 (1947).
78. Jerome Frank, Say it with Music, 61 HARv. L. REV. 921 (1948).
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endorsed the advice Lord Mansfield supposedly gave to a new trial judge
"that he should give his decisions omitting his reasons, since his decisions
would probably be right but his reasons almost surely wrong."7 9
The reason the grounds for decisions lingered in obscurity was that
judges did not reach such judgments through a process of "reasoning";
instead, they appeared to the judge at once, and as a whole. Frank drew
this lesson from the work of Gestalt psychologists, who had emphasized
the way in which the mind perceived phenomena in shapes or wholes
directly, rather than as the combination of parts. "The gestaltist's favorite
illustration," Frank observed, "is a melody: a melody does not result from
the summation of its parts; thus to analyze a melody is to destroy it."so
Indeed, the true explanation for why a judge makes such judgments is in
some sense beyond the reach of language itself.81 Thus, for a judge to
articulate adequately his response to conflicting testimony, "he would be
obliged-as a once popular song put it-to 'say it with music. "82
None of this implied that criticism of trial-court judgments, or reforms
of trial practices, was impossible. To the contrary, Frank wrote at length
about the need for such reforms.83 He thought the process of writing
opinions, for instance, encouraged clear thinking, so he recommended that
courts be required to articulate, to the extent possible, their reasons for
their factual fmdings.m He also suggested trials be filmed, so that one
would have some basis for criticizing a judge's credibility judgments,
which often depended on interpreting a witness's demeanor." But the
reforms for which he advocated most were (1) efforts to make both
substantive and procedural law more flexible so as to allow courts to make
individualized judgments in a more honest and open way8 6; and (2) the
better training of trial judges (and juries), which would include education
as to the power of their own "biases and prejudices."7 Both of these latter
two reforms depend on an assumption that, when given proper scope, and
cultivated in the right way, a judge should trust his or her inchoate
intuitions about what justice requires in the particular case. The question
then is, on what metaphysical and epistemological grounds, if any, did
Frank justify such an optimistic assumption about human intuitions?
One possible answer is natural law.88 For Frank not only embraced the
79. Id. at 926.
80. Id. at 929.
81. Id. at 932 (arguing that a judge's "decisional process, like the artistic process, involves
feelings that words cannot ensnare").
82. Id. at 933.
83. See, e.g., FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 71.
84. Frank, Say it with Music, supra note 78, at 949-50.
85. Id. at 955 (citing Frank's opinion in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d
1948).
86. Id. at 953.
87. Id. at 955.
88. See FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 11343; FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra
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tenets of natural law but endorsed Fuller's particular articulation of it,
quarrelling only with Fuller's use of the term "natural law" itself, which
he thought inferior to the simpler "justice."89 But that answer won't do
because Frank repeatedly emphasized that, even though there were a few
moral principles that applied to all of humanity, those principles were too
abstract to be of aid to the judge adjudicating any particular case.90
Furthermore, even if such principles provided "objective" criteria for
criticizing legal rules or their application, they were not particularly
helpful for the trial judge trying to figure out which witnesses to believe.91
A better answer is that Frank thought that providing satisfying answers
to such metaphysical and epistemological questions was impossible. This
answer should hardly surprise since one of Frank's main points in Law
and the Modern Mind was that we can never have certain knowledge of
"reality" (whether moral or physical) and that we must therefore learn to
live in a perpetual state of "painful suspension," in which we make
decisions even while recognizing the personal nature of the motives that
lay behind our judgments.92 Doing so was exceedingly difficult because of
the mind's natural inclination toward stability and certainty. Only those
with a "mature mind," infused with the "scientific spirit," had the courage
to maintain their convictions in the face of such uncertainty.
But the terms in which Frank described this attitude changed over time.
Whereas in his earlier work, he talked of the courage necessary to live in a
state of "painful suspension," in his later work, he described the same
attitude as a kind of faith.9 3 In his 1945 book, Fate and Freedom, for
instance, Frank endorsed William James's idea of a "faith ladder,"
according to which one reasons from the possibility of some metaphysical
picture being true, to the "fitness" of it being true, to the conclusion that it
"shall be true."94 Indeed, it was on this basis that Frank justified a belief in
note 71, at 346-74. For a discussion of Frank's views on natural law, see Priel & Barzun, supra note
62.
89. FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 296.
90. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 71, at 356 ("That there are a few uniformities
among men, of all times and climes, cannot be doubted. But they are minimal. Above the very few
basic human needs and characteristics are others of amazing flexibility and variety.").
91. Frank, Say it with Music, supra note 78, at 940; Jerome Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal
Pragmatism-John Dewey & Co. vs. Aristotle: II, 25 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 460, 503 (1950)
("Presumably there is such acceptance (of natural law] in Spain and South Ireland; yet no one suggests
that, in those lands, specific court decisions are more predictable and just, less subject to avoidable
mistakes of trial court 'fact-finding' and litigation-uncertainty, than in the United States.").
92. FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 18, at 172-82.
93. Compare id. at 19 ("Most men do not achieve, as [William] James did, the courage to tolerate
much less enjoy, the idea of ultimate and irreducible contingency.") with FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM,
supra note 52, at 16 (arguing that the idea that "[M]en's conscious and deliberate purposes" can shape
the future is a thesis "which can neither be proved nor be disproved scientifically but which is a matter
of faith"). On the connection between faith and courage, see generally PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE
TO BE (1952). See, e.g., id. at 189 ("The Lutheran courage returns but not supported by the faith in a
judging and forgiving God. It returns in terms of the absolute faith which says Yes although there is no
special power that conquers guilt. The courage to take the anxiety of meaninglessness upon oneself is
the boundary line up to which the courage to be can go.").
94. FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 169.
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objective moral principles. "If ideals which some men regard as noble are
realized, they will become natural. Man does not find his 'oughts' spelled
out for him in nature: he puts them there."95
The most important metaphysical position Frank used such a "faith
ladder" to climb towards was the affirmation of human free will.
According to Frank, since one cannot refute the existence of free will on
the basis of empirical evidence, we need not, and therefore, should not,
deny its existence. Revealingly, Frank said he preferred the term
"possibilism" to "free will" because the latter term suggested man's
agency was based in pure emotion or will, whereas in fact it should be
better understood as a free form of "intelligence."9 6 Whatever the precise
term, Frank devoted much of Fate and Freedom to a defense of human
freedom and to an attack on what he perceived to be its threats. Chief
among these was the deterministic assumption of the natural and social
sciences. "Scientific fatalism is but a faith, a dismal and cruel one," Frank
lamented. But he insisted that "[w]e need not accept it" because "[t]here is
no reason why we should forsake the American faith-which rests on the
facts of daily experience-that human purposes are real."97
B. Fuller, Purpose, and Natural Law
Fuller did not emphasize as much as Frank did the role that irrational
biases and prejudices might play in fact-finding or legal interpretation.98
Nevertheless, he agreed with Frank that the true reason for a judge's
decision might well remain obscure to himself. Like Frank, he thought
such motives could serve as a useful guide for legal decisionmaking.
Beginning with his book, The Law in Quest ofltself Fuller used the notion
of human purposes to ground a theory of natural law.99
In that book and in later articles Fuller argued that natural law began
with recognition of the difficulty of divorcing the "is" from the "ought"
when trying to understand human actions and institutions. 1 His argument
for this view consisted in the following line of reasoning: All human
activity is necessarily purposive activity. In order to understand or
describe a person's activities, even if only for the sake of prediction, the
observer must discern the purpose of the person's actions and make a
judgment about whether that purpose has been achieved. But since making
such a judgment depends on an assumption about what counts as success
in achieving that purpose, the judgment is an essentially evaluative one.
95. Id. at 141.
96. Id. at 145.
97. Id. at 105.
98. Though as we have seen, he did not ignore them entirely. See Fuller, Fictions II, supra
note 15, at 519 (discussing "emotional conservatism").
99. See FULLER, QUEST, supra note 42; Lon Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NAT. L.
F. 68 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NAT. L.F. 83 (1958).
100. FULLER, QUEST, supra note 42, at 11-14; Fuller, Human Purpose, supra note 99, at 68-72.
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Therefore, understanding or describing human activity requires
evaluation.101
One question this argument immediately raises is why determining a
subject's purpose requires an evaluative judgment rather than simply a
description of the individual's mental state, namely his intention to take
some action for some goal. There were two parts to Fuller's answer to this
challenge. The first was to deny that having such a purpose was equivalent
to having a conscious intention. Often we have an intention without ever
giving explicit conscious thought to that intention. To illustrate this point,
Fuller quoted Wittgenstein: "Someone says to me: 'Show the children a
game.' I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says, 'I didn't mean
that sort of game.' Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come
before his mind when he gave me the order?"'0 2 To Fuller the answer was
obviously no.
Fuller made the same point in his Contacts casebook. There he observed
that the schools of psychology influenced by Freud had "performed a great
service by dramatizing the fact that the determinants of human conduct are
not to be identified with consciousness." They had shown, rather, that
"many acts are performed in quest of goals of which the actor is himself
completely ignorant."10 3 Thus, the problem of how to understand the
nature of such goals or intentions, according to Fuller, "lies somewhere
between the superficial layer of consciousness and the dark inner recesses
of the human psyche probed by the psychoanalysts.""s
The second part of Fuller's response was to suggest that even if such
unconscious motives were discoverable, they would rarely point to a
single purpose. In one example he offered, he imagined watching a boy
pressing a knife against a clam. We are confused about what the boy is
doing until we understand that he is trying to open the clam.'05 So that is
one purpose. But why is the boy trying to open the clam? To eat it? Or to
learn about mollusks? The answer we provide will determine what we
think of his actions when he then drops the clam and starts running toward
an aquarium. In particular, it will determine whether we think the boy has
radically altered his goal or found a more effective means to achieve his
existing goal.16
Fuller thought that this example illustrated the way that human actions
were directed not to a single purpose but to a "congeries of related
purposes."'07 Thus, in order to understand the boy's actions, Fuller insisted
that one must understand the boy's true purposes, and that requires
101. Fuller, Human Purpose, supra note 99, at 68-71.
102. Id.
103. LON FULLER, BASICS OF CONTRACT LAw 668 (1947).
104. Id.
105. Fuller, Human Purpose, supra note 99, at 69.
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making a judgment about the ultimate purposes of human life. "If I
understand what the boy is doing," Fuller explained, "it is because of our
shared human nature, a nature that in both of us is at all times incomplete
and in process of development."08
Fuller's thought was that the common law could be seen as a similar
sort of process in which judges make reference to shared purposes in order
to understand what their predecessors were up to. Fuller called this process
a "collaborative articulation of shared purposes," in which each judge
made an effort to get at what earlier judges were in some sense trying to
say, but did not or could not because such ends or purposes were "not
stirred into active consciousness [of the previous court] by the facts of the
case being decided."'" Under this view, when there was a line of cases
developing one particular doctrine, we could plausibly say that the facts of
the later cases enabled subsequent judges to "see more truly what they
were all trying to do from the beginning.""(o
Under this view, the formal law was never in perfect conformity with
the purposes or motives behind it because it was never possible to discover
with certainty what those purposes were. Indeed, it was never even
possible to determine whether any given goal was truly the end sought
after or instead simply a means to achieve some further end. Crucially,
though, one selected an end in part by assessing the means available to
achieve it. So, for instance, Fuller argued in a 1954 book review that one
could not determine whether "euthanasia should be legalized without first
considering the social manageability of the task of selecting the right
people to put to death."' In other words, the key was to "hold[] means
and ends open for a reciprocal adjustment with respect to each
problem."112
That law required the constant evaluation of both ends and means, each
in light of the other, meant that law was always in the midst of an
adjustment or, as Fuller would sometimes put it, in the process of
"becoming." He thus once explained why he took so seriously his
students' moral intuitions about cases discussed in class: "If we apply the
term 'law'," he explained, "to that which is coming to be, then the
conclusion of an oncoming generation of lawyers may be 'law' in a more
real sense than the dictum of some eighteenth-century English judge that
happens to be embalmed in a casebook.""3 Fuller thought that the best
interpretation of the natural-law tradition consisted of efforts to articulate
and justify something like that process of "becoming," even if it had often
108. Id.
109. Id. at 74.
110. Fuller, Rejoinder, supra note 99, at 98.
111. Lon Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, A Review of Edwin W. Patterson's
Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas, 6 J. LEG. EDUC. 457, 479 (1954).
112. Id.
113. Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV. 35,41 (1950).
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There are many possible objections to this line of reasoning, but two
particularly glaring ones were leveled against Fuller. His responses to
them are revealing. The first objection denied the plausibility of the view
that judges had "latent" purposes that other judges could subsequently
discover."' To this Fuller responded that the existence of such latent
purposes seemed to him a common truth of psychology, confirmed by
ordinary experience.16 He suggested that we become aware of such
purposes in situations when, perhaps in a moment of crisis, a friend may
"help us to understand what we really want.""' The same idea is implicit
in legal education and practice. He rhetorically asked why courts and law
professors use hypothetical fact-patterns to test a legal rule if not on the
assumption that doing so could help bring into consciousness ideas about
ends, purposes, and values, which we possess in some sense but of which
we are only dimly aware."8
The second objection was that even if such latent purposes do exist, that
fact does not cause a "blurring of fact and value," let alone warrant an
inference to the existence of natural law. Common-law judges could all be
engaged in a collaborative articulation of shared evil purposes.l19 Put
another way, there's a difference between (a) the descriptive claim that a
person has some purpose or end in view (or only partially in view or even
totally out of view) and (b) the evaluative claim that such a purpose or end
is good or worthy of pursuit. To some, Fuller's failure to recognize this
distinction evidenced a deep philosophical confusion, if not intentional
obfuscation.120
Fuller recognized this objection, though he never seemed quite satisfied
with any answer to it. At times, he seemed tempted to reply by resorting to
a more traditional natural-law view, resting on an explicitly teleological
114. Fuller, Human Purpose, supra note 99, at 73.
115. See Ernest Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Reply to Fuller, 3
NAT. L.F. 77, 81 (1958) ("An end-in-view that is nevertheless not explicitly present in active
consciousness seems to me just a myth, the product of the same type of dubious reasoning which
assumes that the outcome of a complex series of changes can be explained only by postulating the
outcome as already 'implicitly present' in the initial terms of the series.")
116. Fuller, Rejoinder, supra note 99, at 96 (saying that he conceived of the existence of such
purposes as "being an almost obvious truth of psychology").
117. Fuller, Human Purpose, supra note 99, at 73.
118. Fuller, Rejoinder, supra 99, at 99.
119. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 629 (1958) (observing that "there may be just the same sense that a new case will implement and
articulate the purpose of a rule in interpreting the rules of a game or some hideously immoral code of
oppression whose immorality is appreciated by those called in to interpret it").
120. See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Should Legal Thought Abandon Clear Distinctions?. Review of The
Law in Quest of Itself, by Lon Fuller, 36 ILL. L. REV. 239, 245-46 (1941) (arguing that "the fact that
the ought and the is are mixed in our dark view . .. is no reason against unmixing them in order to
clarify things and remove some of the darkness" and concluding that "[d]espite Professor Fuller's
professed rejection of mysticism from jurisprudence . .. it is difficult to see how he can deny a definite
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understanding of human nature. "The whole man, taken in the round, is an
enormously complicated set of interrelated and interacting purposes,"
Fuller asserted in the same book review earlier mentioned. "This system of
purposes constitutes his nature, and it is to this nature that natural law
looks in seeking a standard for passing ethical judgments. That is good
which advances man's nature; that is bad which keeps him from realizing
it."l21 In the same article, he cited the political philosopher Leo Strauss as
someone who had come to a similar understanding of natural law.122
But Fuller never developed much further this teleological understanding
of human nature. He seemed reluctant to commit himself to any
understanding of human beings that would strike many as inconsistent
with modern science, explicitly distancing himself from religious
understandings of natural law. Yet he never explained how ethical
principles could be derived from a purely naturalistic or scientific
understanding of human nature. In the same book review, he suggested
that psychoanalysis, though seemingly remote from traditional natural law,
was also premised on the idea that man needs to be "straightened out" and
yet had resources within himself to do such straightening.123 But he did not
attempt to justify that premise, except o say that "if the psychoanalyst
does not do something roughly equivalent to helping his patient realize his
'true nature,' then his whole profession loses intelligible meaning."124
In the end, then, Fuller's faith in the reality or intelligibility of
discerning true or universal human purposes amounted to a not-very-well
articulated article of faith. His attitude is perhaps best conveyed in a letter
he wrote to his friend and interlocutor, H.L.A. Hart, in response to Hart's
review of Fuller's book, The Morality of Law. Hart had concluded his
review by observing that Fuller "has all his life been in love with the
notion of purpose and this passion, like any other, can both inspire and
blind a man. I have tried to show how it has done both to the author."l25
About this passage Fuller wrote to Hart:
All I can say of Miss Purpose is that the Old Girl still looks good to
me. One of her enduring charms is that she is a very complex creature
indeed, subject to unpredictable moods of surrender and withdrawal. I
believe deeply in her without pretending that I really understand her.
So the high romance of which you complain will probably continue
despite your thoughtful warning that our liaison promises trouble.126
121. Lon Fuller, Philosophy at Mid-Century, supra note 111, at 472.
122. Id.at471 n.26.
123. Id. at 473.
124. Id.
125. H.L.A. Hart, Book Review: Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1296
(1965).
126. Letter to H.L.A. Hart, February 3, 1965 (Lon Fuller Papers, Box 3, Folder 14).
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C. Common Themes: Faith and Human Purpose
Summing up, Frank and Fuller both understood all knowledge to depend
on human motives, but neither drew deeply skeptical conclusions from the
fact of such dependence. Instead, they both thought that some motives
were better than others for the purpose of theoretical and practical
decisionmaking and, in particular, for the purpose of judicial
decisionmaking. Furthermore, both thought that ensuring that a judge's
intuitive reactions to a particular set of facts reflected good purposes
(moral principles or wise policies) rather than bad ones (or personal
biases) required the judge to engage in careful introspection.
This line of reasoning invites a demand for justification: Why think that
such intuitions put judges on the right track when making decisions?
Fuller and Frank responded to this demand in somewhat different ways.
Fuller suggested that there might be common, perhaps even universal,
human purposes, which judges intuit by virtue of being either part of the
community or simply by being human. He thus looked for, and thought he
could find, regularities or patterns in social life, not just in terms of
behavior, but in terms of common purposes, needs, and values. The
common law offered one example of judges inquiring into such common
purposes, the pursuit of which he thought amounted to a form of natural
law. Hence, law as human purpose and "becoming."
But if Fuller sought uniformities and commonalities in human nature,
Frank celebrated man's uniqueness and the value of diversity. He chafed
at the use of the term "natural law" because it suggested that man's nature
was fixed and determined. For the same reason he rejected what he took to
be the assumptions and implications of various social sciences, instead
arguing that each individual was unique and free and that social progress
was neither inevitable nor impossible. One must strive for it. Although
Frank recognized the existence of a few universal moral principles, he
insisted that they were too abstract to be of help to the individual facing a
particular decision, such as a judge deciding a case. In such circumstances,
the judge had only his intuitions and judgments about the facts before him.
And though he could never be certain that his motive to secure justice was
not being distorted by passion or prejudice, better to have faith in one's
own intuitions of justice than to try to eliminate or constrain them through
the use of rigid substantive or procedural rules. Hence, law as the
personality of the judge.
In fact, though, even in explaining their faith in human intuitions and
emotions, the two approaches circle back on one another. Frank did
ultimately endorse parts of the natural-law tradition, objecting primarily to
the term itself, rather than to what he took to be its core claim, which was
that there are broad moral principles applicable to all people at all times.
At the same time, Fuller's endorsement of natural law is probably best
understood as the result of his own effort to climb James's "faith ladder"
in just the way Frank endorsed. Fuller began Law in Quest of Itself the
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book in which he first defended a natural-law view, by describing his
conception of legal philosophy as a "pragmatic" one, whose purpose was
"to give a profitable and satisfying direction to the application of human
energies in the law" and to ask what effect one's words might have on law
students, lawyers and judges.127 It thus seems likely that he saw his own
effort to develop a theory of natural law as justified primarily by how it
might affect the way judges and lawyers think about their roles and tasks,
rather by a set of metaphysical doctrines.128 Indeed, for Fuller,
metaphysical doctrines were themselves best justified on pragmatic
grounds. As he said in closing his contribution to a collection of essays
entitled, My Philosophy of Law, "[w]e must have a good metaphysics
before we can have a good politics. And a good metaphysics is one which
gives form to life without stifling it."' 29
D. Technocratic instrumentalism: Lasswell and McDougal's "Policy
Science"
Frank and Fuller's shared philosophical assumptions can be seen even
more clearly by setting them both in contrast to a quite different approach
to legal reasoning advanced at the same time they were writing. In the
early 1940s, two Yale professors wrote a now-famous article that has been
said to "mark the clear beginning of the post-realist period" in American
legal scholarship.130 In "Legal Education and Public Policy," Harold
Lasswell, a political scientist, and Myres McDougal, a law professor,
boldly put forth a vision of the lawyer's role in the world and the methods
and skills he would need to serve it."' Over the next several years, they
taught these skills and methods, which they called "policy science," in a
course at Yale law school. Although the views of McDougal and Lasswell
depend on assumptions and goals similar to those we have seen in the
work of Frank and Fuller, the vision of law and legal theory they offered
differ dramatically from the views described above.13 2
Like many other legal theorists with legal-realist sympathies (including,
as we have seen, Frank and Fuller), McDougal and Lasswell understood
law in instrumental terms, as a tool designed to accomplish certain
127. FULLER, QUEST, supra note 42, at 2.
128. It is for this reason that Fred Schauer suggests that we might charitably read Fuller as writing
from an "internal point of view." See Frederick Schauer, Fuller's Internal Point of View, 13 LAW &
PHIL. 285, 302 (1994). For reasons stated elsewhere, I find that characterization unsatisfying. See
Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 57-61 (2013);
Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal-External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101
VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015).
129. Lon L. Fuller, My Philosophy of Law - Credos of Sixteen Scholars 125 (1941) (Reprint
1987).
130. DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 169 (quoting Robert Stevens, "Two Cheers for 1870: The
American Law School," 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AM. HIST. 403 (1971)).
131. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
132. DUxBURY, supra note 5, at 168.
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goals."' They also stressed the need for law to look beyond traditional
legal materials. They expressed frustration with earlier realist efforts to
incorporate the social sciences because those realists had lacked a clear
understanding of the purpose to which those social sciences needed to be
put.'34 Lasswell and McDougal lamented that although lawyers had
recognized the need to evaluate legal doctrines and procedures according
to how well they achieved social purposes, "there is little conscious,
systematic effort to relate [those doctrines and procedures] clearly and
consistently to the major problems of a society struggling to achieve
democratic values." 35
Here lies the first key difference between their approach and that of
Frank and Fuller. Whereas those thinkers emphasized the inherent
difficulty of knowing precisely what one's own values and motives were -
so that one had to discover them as one worked through a problem or
reasoned through an issue-Lasswell and McDougal stressed that the
modem lawyer must develop "goal-thinking," so that he could engage in
effective "policymaking." This required having a "clear conception of
goal," which meant that the student needed to "clarify his moral values
(preferred events, social goals)." 136
For Lasswell and McDougal, "clarifying" moral values did not mean
probing into their foundations. Here the contrast with Fuller is particularly
striking. Fuller would later observe in a short 1950 essay that the question
of "[h]ow far we should pursue ultimates" was dictated mostly by
intellectual fashion. He then lamented that "[t]he pressures of our present
intellectual climate are toward truncating the inquiry at the earliest
possible point," but he nevertheless insisted that he would resist that
pressure and "push my inquiry a little farther toward the abyss than is
customary."'3 ' Lasswell and McDougal, however, insisted that the process
of clarifying values be distinguished from the effort to derive values,
which was "a notorious blind alley." Such an endeavor, they explained,
"quickly becomes a futile quest for a meaningless why, perpetually
culminating in 'some inevitably circular and infinitely regressive logical
justification' for ambiguous preferences."' So rather than derive such
values, Lasswell and McDougal stipulated them: "In our civilization, at
least, representative values are power, respect, knowledge, income, and
safety (including health)." 39
133. See DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 171 (observing that although Lasswell and McDougal were
critical of realists for their lack of clear objectives, they "applauded realist jurisprudence for the fact
that it represented, in general, a pioneering attempt to integrate law with the social sciences").
134. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 131, at 204.
135. Id. at 205.
136. Id. at 212.
137. Fuller, On Teaching Law, supra note 113, at 36.
138. Id. at 213 (quoting McDougal, Fuller vs. the Realists, supra note 42, at 835) (emphasis in
original).
139. Id. at 217.
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Once the lawyer had his policies or values in clear view, the next step
was to determine the most efficient means of implementing them. Herein
lies the other feature that distinguished Lasswell and McDougal's
approach from what we have seen in both Frank and Fuller - their
confidence in scientific methods. According Lasswell and McDougal,
lawyers must know how to conduct "accurate calculation of probabilities,
and adept application of knowledge of ways and means." The lawyer must
learn "trend-thinking" and "scientific-thinking," which required him to
"orient himself correctly in contemporary trends and future probabilities"
in order to better predict possible outcomes.1̀  Thankfully, recent progress
in the human sciences had made predicting human behavior easier. Thanks
to "the rapid expansion of the social and psychological sciences," they
explained, "the observing of human conduct has become progressively
more technical and exhaustive." Indeed, social scientists had made the
most progress in "the perfecting of method by which ancient speculations
can be confirmed, modified or rejected."l4 1
The contrast drawn should now be clear. Whereas Frank and Fuller both
stressed the impossibility of ever having complete consciousness of
human motives and purposes, Lasswell and McDougal took awareness of
one's goals or values to be the first step in the rational implementation of
policy. Fuller himself drew the contrast between his own method and that
envisioned by McDougal and Lasswell. For them, he explained, "the
philosopher or legal reformer is supposed to determine what values are to
be effectuated" while the rest is "a matter of technical implementation
with which Professors McDougal and Lasswell have no direct concern and
for which they assume no responsibility."1 42 Fuller thought this approach
absurd, and he illustrated the point through the example of a game. One
would never say, he insisted, "Let us first decide what kind of enjoyment
we seek from our projected game. Then let us draw up rules for a game
that will yield this form of enjoyment." Instead, when inventing a game
"we shall have to start with ends vaguely perceived and held in suspension
while we explore the problem of devising a workable system of play."143
In short, if Lasswell and McDougal saw lawyers and judges as
"policymakers" or technocrats, Frank and Fuller each saw them as
something like artists or craftsmen.
V. ROMANTIC PRAGMATISM: A TRADITION?
The ends to which courts have addressed themselves, the reasons and
motives that have guided them, have often been vaguely felt,
intuitively or almost intuitively apprehended, seldom explicitly
140. Id. at 213.
141. Id. at 214.
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avowed. There has been little of deliberate introspection, of
dissection, of analysis, of philosophizing.
Benjamin Cardozo (1921)'"
[I]n less guarded moment [judges] tell a different and more romantic
story. They say that law is instinct rather than explicit in doctrine,
that it can be identified only by special techniques best described
impressionistically, even mysteriously. They say that judging is an
art, not a science, that a good judge blends analogy, craft, political
wisdom, and a sense of his role into an intuitive decision, that he
"sees" law better than he can explain it, so his written opinion,
however carefully reasoned, never captures his full insight.
Ronald Dworkin (1986)145
I have sought to identify in this Article a number of themes common to
the work of Jerome Frank and Lon Fuller. In both we see the idea that
people's perceptions of the world are fundamentally shaped by their
emotions, motives, and purposes and that those emotions, motives and
purposes often remain unconscious. Judges can decide cases justly if they
attend to their own felt reactions the facts of the cases before them. When
they do so, judges should try their best to articulate the reasons that they
think justifies or supports their decisions. Both Frank and Fuller recognize,
however, that such attempts at articulation are often only partially
successful. Nevertheless, in spite of the incompleteness of such efforts-
indeed, because of its incompleteness-both thinkers maintain a faith that
the Anglo-American method of case-by-case adjudication is a just method
for resolving disputes and developing the law. The sort of practical
reasoning adjudication requires, under this view, is one that requires
judges to engage in a process of self-examination or introspection as to
their true purposes and values.
This common set of views is what I call a romantic pragmatist
understanding of adjudication and legal reasoning. The terms
"pragmatism" and "romanticism" are both ones that are so commonly used
that invoking them risks causing confusion or, worse, making vacuous
claims." Some clarification of my use of those terms is therefore
warranted. I will then raise two objections to this characterization.
144. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 47 (1921).
145. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 10 (1986).
146. The classic statement of this worry is Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Meaning of Romanticism for
the Historian ofIdeas, 2. J. HIST. OF IDEAS 257, 258 (1941) (arguing that the diversity of uses to which
the term has been put "furnishes sufficient proof, if any were needed, that 'Romanticism' has no
generally understood meaning and has therefore come to be useless as a verbal symbol"). See also
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989) ("The word [Romanticism] has a bewildering
number of definitions; and some have even doubted that there is such a unified phenomenon, as
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A. Romantic Pragmatism
Pragmatism sometimes refers to a view about the nature of truth
according to which what it means for some proposition to be true is not
that it corresponds to some feature of the external world but rather that it
"works" or has favorable practical consequences.147 But I mean it to refer
more broadly to the view that experience supplies the proper test for
assessing philosophical doctrines, whether metaphysical, ethical, or
otherwise. Such an approach sometimes, but not always, entails the
rejection of traditional philosophical dichotomies, such as those between
reason and emotion, fact and value, mind and world.14 8
The concept of "experience" is, of course, somewhat vague and may
invite more questions than it answers.149 Is it individual experience, or the
collective experience of a community?"'o More important for our
purposes, what kinds of experience count as a basis for validation?
Observations? Moral intuitions? Mystical feelings?'"' Philosophical
pragmatists differ on such issues.
Consider, for instance, two mid-century pragmatists, W. V. Quine and
Morton White. Both philosophers famously rejected the analytic/synthetic
distinction, which had been a foundational assumption of logical
positivism, the dominant philosophical view at the time and one that
privileged the methods of the natural sciences.'52 But they interpreted the
demands of pragmatic thinking in different ways. Quine is well known for
insisting that in the sciences, "no statement is immune from revision,"
suggesting a fallibilism typical of pragmatists.15 But he still agreed with
the logical positivists that observation through the senses was the only sort
of experience that could validate philosophical knowledge. He therefore
argued that traditional areas of philosophical inquiry, such as ethics and
epistemology, should be "naturalized", that is, transformed into objects of
empirical study using the methods of the natural sciences.154 White,
147. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Pragmatism (Oct. 7, 2013) ("The core of pragmatism
was the pragmatist maxim, a rule for clarifying the contents of hypotheses by tracing their 'practical
consequences'. In the work of Peirce and James, the most influential application of the pragmatist
maxim was to the concept of truth."), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/.
148. See, e.g., id. ("All the pragmatists, but most of all Dewey, challenge the sharp dichotomy
that other philosophers draw between theoretical beliefs and practical deliberations.").
149. See CHERYL MISAK, THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS xi (2013) (observing that "the nature of
the requisite connection between beliefs and experience is a complex matter for the pragmatists").
150. See id. at 37 (explaining that Pierce "thought that truth was a matter for the community of
inquirers-not for this or that individual inquirer"); id. at 60 (" . . . James adds to Peirce that we must
pay attention to the significance that each of us places upon our own particular actions.").
151. See id. at 68 ("Mystical experience, James argues, is the province of the subconscious and is
as telling for the perceiver as is the experience of ordinary, mundane consciousness.").
152. W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951); Morton White, The
Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism, in JOHN DEWEY: PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE AND
FREEDOM (1950).
153. Id. at 40. See Stanford Encyclopedia, supra note 147 (observing that pragmatists "tended to
share a distinctive epistemological outlook, a fallibilist anti-Cartesian approach to the norms that
govern inquiry").
154. W. V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS
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meanwhile, insisted that one's moral intuitions properly count as part of
how we validate our beliefs, including ethical and metaphysical ones. He
thus had more faith than did Quine in the value of philosophical inquiry in
such traditional areas as ethics, religion, aesthetics, and law.15
This latter sort of pragmatism, which includes emotional reactions and
intuitions as the sort of "experience" that can validate beliefs and which is
associated with William James, Morton White, and others, is the one I dub
"romantic." I mean that term not to describe the quality that contrasts with
"realist" or "rationalist" views, but rather to refer to a set of ideas
connected to the particular movement in art and literature that began in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In particular, I intend the
term to refer to three features commonly associated with that movement.
The first and most obvious is the idea that the human self has a certain
inner depth full of emotions and intuitions and that attending to those
emotions can yield genuine aesthetic and ethical insight.156 The second is
the view that such feelings are often stimulated by particular and concrete
experiences and that generalizing from such concrete experiences is
always difficult, making our attempts to articulate our judgments about
them always partial and imperfect.1 7 The third and final feature is the
insistence upon the foundational role played by the first two features. If
our evaluative judgments are properly understood as efforts to articulate
genuine moral insights derived from our responses to concrete experience,
(1969).
155. See MORTON WHITE, TOWARD REUNION IN PHILOSOPHY 20 (1956) ("Once logicians and
epistemologists begin to speak of justifying conceptual frameworks by reference to considerations of
expediency, as some do, and once others begin to counter by appealing to intuition or conscience, as
they do, we can see that we are entering a subject which might well profit from the two thousand years
or so of moral philosophy in which very similar questions have been discussed."). See also MORTON
WHITE, A PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE xi (2002) ("I also came to believe that ethics may be viewed as
empirical if one includes feelings of moral obligation as well as sensory experiences in the pool or flux
into which the ethical believer worked a manageable structure (to use a James-like figure that Quine
had once used when characterizing the purpose of science)."); id. at 154 ("Quine differentiates more
sharply than I do between an observation sentence like 'that's a rabbit' and the sentence 'that ought
not to be done' or 'that's outrageous,' its counterparts in my view of the confirmation of ethical
beliefs. That difference between us reflects my inclination to emphasize the similarity between ethical
and scientific thinking and Quine's different inclination.").
156. TAYLOR, supra note 146, at 368 ("This notion of an inner voice or impulse, the idea that we
find the truth within us, and in particular in our feelings-these were the crucial justifiying concepts of
the Romantic rebellion in its various forms."); Harold Bloom, ed., Romanticism and Consciousness:
Essays in Criticism 1 (1970) ("Subjectivity or self-consciousness is the salient problem of
Romanticism, at least for modem readers, who tend to station themselves in regard to the Romantics
depending on how relevant or adequate they judge the dialectic of consciousness and imagination to
be.").
157. ROBERT LANGBAUM, THE POETRY OF EXPERIENCE: THE DRAMATIC MONOLOGUE IN
MODERN LITERARY TRADITION 35 (1957) (explaining that the essence of romanticism is the "doctrine
of experience," according to which "the imaginative apprehension gained through immediate
experience is primary and certain, whereas the analytic reflection that follows is secondary and
problematical"); TAYLOR, supra note 146, at 390 ("The sense of depth in inner space is bound up with
the sense that we can move into it and bring things to the fore. This we do when we articulate. The
inescapable feeling of depth comes from the realization that whatever we bring up, there is always
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then such evaluations are, in some sense, empirical or descriptive ones.
Such a capacity thus provides a firmer ground for moral and aesthetic
judgments-a ground that used to be provided by larger metaphysical or
theological frameworks.'
The romantic pragmatist about ethics or practical reasoning, then, is a
pragmatist who believes that one's moral beliefs, like one's scientific
beliefs, should always be open to revision and subject to the test of
experience. But she is also a romantic who believes that one's intuitions or
emotional responses contain real moral insight. She is thus the sort of
pragmatist who, when reasoning about ethical matters, treats such
intuitions or internal reactions as part of the experience that tests the
adequacy of her beliefs.
It is not hard to see, then, why Frank and Fuller may plausibly be
described as romantic pragmatists when it comes to adjudication and legal
reasoning. Both of them thought legal rules should be assessed by how
well they achieve the purposes for which they exist. Frank encouraged
judges to reflect on their own emotional responses in order to ensure that
they are not beholden to biases and prejudices59 ; he praised the "scientific
spirit," which welcomes uncertainty and the questioning of settled
dogma"; he envisioned the judge as an artist who can never quite
articulate the true grounds for decision.'6 ' Similarly, Fuller defended legal
fictions on the ground that they provide just results even when judges
cannot articulate a satisfying legal justification'62; he insisted that here are
purposes latent in the law that judges can intuitively discem163; and (for
these reasons) he envisioned the judge's role as part creation, part
discovery.16 Finally, both thinkers argued that judicial decisionmaking
can be just even when there are not clear rules governing a case precisely
because judges may be guided by introspective inquiry. That is why they
are both romantic pragmatists about law and adjudication.
B. Historical Implications
Understanding Frank and Fuller as romantic pragmatists is useful for
both historical and philosophical reasons. As an historical matter,
identifying the intellectual connections between Frank and Fuller provides
158. TAYLOR, supra 146, at 380 ("The old order based on the ontic logos was no longer
acceptable.... What replaced the interlocking order was the Romantic notion of a purpose or life
coursing through nature."); Langbaum, supra note , at 26 ("[The Romanticist] discovers through
experience the empiric ground for values. He does this by giving himself so completely to each object
that the object is allowed to generate its own laws, creating the values compatible with its full
existence.... The romanticist is thus always in the process of formulating values, although he never
arrives at a final formulation.").
159. See supra, p. 134.
160. See supra, p. 135.
161. See supra, p. 146.
162. See supra, p. 135.
163. See supra, pp. 149-53.
164. See supra, p. 151.
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a new perspective on mid-twentieth-century legal thought. The
romantic/technocratic distinction drawn here cuts across the traditional
realism/process theory dichotomy. During both periods one finds both
strands of legal pragmatism on offer.
The interpretation here offered expands upon a revisionist account of
twentieth-century legal theory. Neil Duxbury has argued that, contrary to
the conventional wisdom at the time, legal-process theory was less a
"response" to legal realism than it was the manifestation of an attitude
about law-in particular, a faith in its immanent rationality-that had
begun long before the 1940s and has endured long past it.'6' Elsewhere I
have argued that in certain ways legal process theory was indeed an effort
to respond to certain aspects of legal realism.1 66 It is nevertheless true that
the continuity we find in Fuller's and Frank's thought over more than two
decades in some ways confirms Duxbury's thesis.
This Article is meant to build upon this revisionist account in two ways.
First, it brings out the way in which (perhaps ironically) the "rationalist"
tradition in general depends on the romantic faith in the epistemic value of
intuitions - and the introspection necessary to discern them - for the
purposes of judicial decisionmaking. As the quotations that introduced this
Part indicate, this idea both preceded the work of Frank and Fuller and has
continued long after it.
The second way it builds upon Duxbury's account is by clarifying that
the romantic faith in introspection does not entail the endorsement of
law's immanent rationality (or vice versa). Duxbury does not group
Jerome Frank along with Roscoe Pound, Benjamin Cardozo, Henry Hart,
Ronald Dworkin, and other defenders of law's rationality.'6 7 Now we can
see why: Although Frank shared with these others the idea that one's
intuitions about particular cases serve as a genuine ethical guide, he
differed from them and from Fuller in his relative lack of confidence in
judges' ability to generalize from those intuitions. Frank doubted the
existence or at least the utility of general principles of natural law, and he
welcomed the diversity, rather than uniformity, of judicial judgments.
Under this view, then, part of what distinguishes Frank from the
rationalist tradition Duxbury describes is not a denial of the power of
judges to decide particular cases in a just way. Rather, it is a skepticism
that the morally salient facts which make certain judicial outcomes just
ones are universalizable. The difference between Frank, on the one hand,
and Fuller and others in the "rationalist" tradition, on the other, is not
165. DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 205-06.
166. Barzun, Hart & Sacks, supra note 128, at 4748.
167. Each of those theorists are discussed in Duxbury's chapter entitled, "Finding Faith in
Reason." DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 205-99. Of course, part of the reason for the omission of Frank is
that, as I've argued here and elsewhere, scholars have misunderstood Frank. But part of the reason is
that the relevant connection between Frank and Fuller is not one about the existence of reason in the
law, at least not as "reason" is conventionally understood.
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about the need for judges to introspect-they all agreed they should. The
difference is about the generality of the truths thereby discovered. In that
way, the difference maps to analogous differences among the original
romantic critics and artists.'68
C. Philosophical Implications
Have we simply returned, then, to the age-old and hackneyed question
of whether law is an art or a science? That is how Dworkin frames the
issue in the quotation introducing this Part. Though sympathetic to the
romantic account, Dworkin goes on to dismiss it as "too unstructured, too
content with the mysteries it savors, to count as a developed theory of
what legal argument is about." He thus insists on the need to "throw
discipline over the idea of law as craft."1 69
The art/science distinction does point in the right direction. But that
framing of the issue is conclusory insofar as it assumes particular
understandings of art and science which are themselves controversial.
Romanticism is often contrasted with both "classical" and "modern" forms
of music, art, or poetry, and yet those sensibilities have just as much claim
to the notion of counting as "art" as does the romantic one.' The same is
true of science, the nature of which is still a question of lively controversy.
How are to we understand, for instance, what scientists actually do? Are
they engaged in a primarily intellectual or technological enterprise?"' Do
they engage in acts of genuine discovery? If so, what is the nature of that
process? Is there a so-called "logic of discovery" that can be formalized in
terms analogous to the "logic of justification?" Or do scientific discoveries
result from a "flash of insight" that is itself resistant to systematization? 172
Analogous questions can be asked about law. In what sense, or under
what conditions, can legal methods, sources, and values constitute a
168. TAYLOR, supra note 146, at 369 (observing of the romantics, that "[s]ometimes the voice or
impulse is seen as particular to the person himself; it is the voice of one's self' and that "[s]ometimes
it is also seen as the impulse in us of nature, as the larger order in which we are set").
169. Id.atl0-11.
170. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note 71, at 394-95 (criticizing a legal scholar's
suggestion that in both art and law "rhythm or pattern has the value of regulating," which Frank
characterizes as a "classical" view of both art and law).
171. See Alfred Nordmann, Review of Lena Soler et al, "Science after the Practice Turn in the
Philosophy, History, and Social Studies of Science," NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (June, 2015)
(concluding his review with the observation that "[w]hat is at stake with all these questions is not what
scientists do but whether their practice is intellectual or technological").
172. See Thomas Nickles, Discovery, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Science (W. H.
Newton-Smith ed., 2000) (including among "central, overlapping clusters of questions that
philosophers and methodologists raise about discovery" such questions as "[i]s the manner in which
scientists make discoveries at all similar to the way in which they test them? Is this justificatory
'checkout' procedure really part of the larger discovery process rather than distinct from it? Can
discoveries be explained rationally, or do they always contain irrational or nonrational elements, such
as inspiration or blind luck?"). For a discussion of the distinction between the "context of discovery"
and the "context of justification" as drawn by legal theorists, with particular application to European
legal theory, see Stef Feyen, Towards Systematic Realism (working title), diss. doct. Leuven
University 2016, Ch. 2, forthcoming.
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source of genuine discovery of truths about the world? Or, conversely, to
what extent are they instead properly understood as merely practical tools
for the implementing antecedently fixed ends or goals - irrespective of
whether those goals are understood to be the outcome of some "rational"
process or merely to be the reflection of some individual or group's
arbitrary will. In other words, the question is whether there is a role of
genuine discovery in legal practice analogous to what some find in
scientific practice.
What is at issue here is not the traditional question about the "nature of
law" that has occupied legal philosophers for the last several decades. That
question, as typically framed, is whether law depends exclusively on
"social facts" (as Hart and other positivists argue) or instead depends on a
combination of social facts and values (as Dworkin and anti-positivists
argue).' That is a metaphysical question about what determines the
content of law.174 The question here is an epistemological one: Whatever
facts make some rules or principles qualify as valid law, is it possible to
learn genuine truths about the world by reflecting on the various methods,
sources, and values that constitute legal practice as a whole? And if so,
what assumptions does an affirmative answer depend on? In other words,
it asks whether law qualifies as an intellectual discipline or is instead
simply a practical instrument of social control (and, possibly, moral
guidance).
As it turns out, both Fuller and Frank were very interested in the ways in
which legal concepts and practices had had an intellectual influence on
other sciences and disciplines.175 True, they each tended to focus on
different aspects of the legal process. Frank was more concerned with trial
processes and the evaluation of witness testimony, whereas Fuller was
more interested in the processes of appellate adjudication, particularly
where the relevant rules did not dictate a clear outcome. Yet both saw an
important connection between the methods and procedures of legal
practice and the ends towards which the law should aim, so that one could
learn something about the latter by studying the former. This Article has
suggested that they could only maintain such a faith in the possibility of
genuine discovery of truth through the examination of legal practices
because they were romantic pragmatists, that is, because they believed in
173. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d 2011); DWORKIN, supra note 145.
174. Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1167 (2015) ("All three
views [in the Hart-Dworkin debate] offer an answer to the same question. The question is what facts
determine the content of the law. In different ways, all three views purport to provide a metaphysical
account of our legal rights, obligations, privileges, and powers.").
175. Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 15 at 907 ("It should be recalled that the courts were pioneers
not only in the field of the social sciences, but perhaps in the field of science generally. If we define
science as the conscious generalization of experience, then the law was the first of the sciences.");
Jerome Frank, A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders ofLegal Pragmatism, 9
RUTGERS L. REV. 425 (1954) (noting that law has had an influence on scientific thought with respect
to such concepts as "fact," "cause," "responsibility," and "average" and observing that "[t]he 'logic of
discovery' (or of 'invention') has its roots in lawyers' techniques").
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the epistemic value of "imagination, intuition, insight."'76
VI. CONCLUSION
Jerome Frank and Lon Fuller are typically placed on opposite sides of
most of the dichotomies drawn in legal theory, whether by legal historians
or philosophers. But along one dimension-whether and in what sense law
may properly be seen as an intellectual practice-they were very much, as
we might say today, on the same page. That is because they shared a
common philosophical outlook according to which the human mind
constructs knowledge by imposing its (sometimes unconscious) purposes
on the world, rather than by merely passively observing it. The
consequence of this view was a belief in the interdependencies between
means and ends, theory and practice, reason and emotion, and between
factual and evaluative judgments. Some legal scholars in their day shared
this outlook. But even many who adopted an instrumentalist understanding
of law rejected it. No doubt one could find a similar split today. The
failure of the traditional categories to track the lines of this debate suggests
that those categories are leaving out something important.
176. FRANK, MODERN MIND, supra note 18, at 181.
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